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AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION STATUTES 
IN NEW YORK, NEBRASKA, AND MINNESOTA 
Nicholas Clark Buttino* 
Abstract: States passed agricultural preservation statutes in part to protect 
their agricultural heritage. Some scholars worry that right-to-farm statutes 
have not succeeded in achieving this goal. The agricultural preservation 
statutes of New York, Nebraska, and Minnesota show three different strate-
gies toward agricultural preservation, all of which take different stances on 
the protections extended to small and large farms. Despite the structural 
differences among the states’ statutory approach to agricultural preserva-
tion, all three experienced similar agricultural demographic shifts since the 
1980s—the number of large and small farms has increased while the num-
ber of medium-sized farms has decreased. The similarity in demographic 
trends suggests that none of the statutes are effective. Legislatures may be 
able to redirect their agricultural preservation statutes by empowering agri-
cultural advisory boards to consider not only the soundness of farming 
practices but also the cultural and environmental value of individual farms. 
Introduction 
 Since Thomas Jefferson’s conception of a society of middle class 
farmers, the idea of the small farm has been fixed in America as an es-
sential part of its heritage and economy.1 Responding to population 
shifts after World War II, every state passed a right-to-farm statute to 
maintain the economic and cultural importance of farms.2 Right-to-
farm statutes3 assist farmers in two ways—they offer protection from 
                                                                                                                      
 
* Executive Note Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 
2011–12. 
1 William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor 
Public Health with Our Nation’s Tax Dollars, 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 213, 216 (2009); Jacqueline 
P. Hand, Right-to-Farm Laws: Breaking New Ground in the Preservation of Farmland, 45 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. 289, 289 (1984). 
2 Terrence J. Centner, Governments and Unconstitutional Takings: When Do Right-to-Farm 
Laws Go Too Far? 33 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 87, 87, 88 (2006); Hand, supra note 1, at 290. 
3 Agricultural preservation statutes, as used in this Note, refer to any statute designed 
to assist farmers. These statutes include not only right-to-farm statutes, but also tax breaks 
for agricultural zoning, conservation purchase programs, and limitations on corporate 
farming. Cf. Sam Sheronick, Note, The Accretion of Cement and Steel onto Prime Iowa Farmland: 
99 
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nuisance suits and prohibit municipalities from passing burdensome 
zoning laws that would restrict farming operations.4 States passed most 
of these right-to-farm statutes in the 1970s and 1980s.5 Since then, 
many scholars have questioned the effectiveness and purpose of right-
to-farm statutes.6 Specifically, right-to-farm statutes can shield busi-
nesses from environmental protection laws without offering substantial 
benefits to economic growth, conservation of open spaces, or cultural 
preservation.7 
 In response to such criticism, scholars noted that protections for 
small farms tend to further the goals of right-to-farm statutes and agri-
cultural preservation more broadly, whereas protections for large farms 
may be unnecessary subsidies.8 Perhaps the problem with right-to-farm 
statutes is that they do not adequately distinguish between plaintiffs 
(residents versus developers) and defendants (large commercial farms 
versus small family farms).9 Nevertheless, several states implemented 
right-to-farm statutes in the hopes of promoting environmental inter-
ests and small family farms.10 
 The agricultural preservation statutes in New York, Nebraska, and 
Minnesota provide examples of different strategies for protecting all 
                                                                                                                      
A Proposal for a Comprehensive State Agricultural Zoning Plan, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 583, 585 n.21, 
587–89 (1991) (discussing the different approaches to agricultural preservation as includ-
ing right-to-farm statutes, zoning, and tax benefits). 
4 See Hand, supra note 1, at 295, 299. 
5 See Centner, supra note 2, at 94. 
6 See, e.g., Centner, supra note 2, at 145–46; Alexander A. Reinert, Note, The Right to 
Farm: Hog-Tied and Nuisance-Bound, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1694, 1718 (1998). Alexander Reinert 
was a student at N.Y.U. at the time he wrote this note. Id. at 1694. He is now an associate 
professor of law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University. Profile: 
Alexander Reinert, Cardozo Law, http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx 
?ccmd=ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10688 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
7 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1735–38; see also Neil D. Hamilton, Right-to-Farm Laws Re-
considered: Ten Reasons Why Legislative Efforts to Resolve Agricultural Nuisances May Be Ineffec-
tive, 3 Drake J. Agric. L. 103, 118 (1998) (arguing that right-to-farm statutes must be 
more comprehensive to be effective and fair). 
8 See, e.g., Matt Chester, Note, Anticorporate Farming Legislation: Constitutionality and Eco-
nomic Policy, 9 Drake J. Agric. L. 79, 82 (2004); Reinert, supra note 6, at 1722, 1736–37; see 
also Tiffany Dowell, Comment, Daddy Won’t Sell the Farm: Drafting Right to Farm Statutes to 
Protect Small Family Producers, 18 San Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 127, 152–53 (2008–09) (sug-
gesting that nuisance protections in right-to-farm statutes are not strong enough to ensure 
preservation of family farms). 
9 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1736. 
10 See, e.g., Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982) (banning corporate ownership of farms in 
Nebraska); Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2010) (defining Minnesota’s right-to-farm law and ex-
cluding large concentrated animal feeding operations); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300 
(McKinney 2011) (stating the purpose of New York’s agricultural preservation laws). 
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farms and specifically small farms.11 New York has a standard right-to-
farm statute that provides farmers with protection from nuisance suits 
and interference from municipalities.12 Nebraska banned corporate 
farming from 1982 to 2006 through a constitutional amendment.13 
Minnesota has both restricted corporate farming and removed nui-
sance protections for certain concentrated animal feeding operations 
(CAFOs).14 Clearly, the states have different perspectives on how to 
protect small farms.15 
 Empirical analysis indicates that despite their different approaches 
to agricultural preservation, all three states show similar changes in 
farming trends.16 For example, in all three the number of large and 
                                                                                                                      
 
11 See Neb. Const. art. XII; § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 561.19; N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 
§ 300. 
12 N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 305-a, 308. 
13 Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); see Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1271 (8th Cir. 
2006) (striking down the amendment as unconstitutional under the dormant commerce 
clause). 
14 Minn. Stat. §§ 500.24, 561.19. 
15 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 561.19; N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 
§ 300. 
16 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC-07-A-23, 2007 Census of Agriculture: Minnesota 
State and County Data 10, 17 (2009) [hereinafter 2007 Minn. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., AC-07-A-27, 2007 Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State and County Data 
10, 17 (2009) [hereinafter 2007 Neb. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC-07-A-32, 2007 Cen-
sus of Agriculture: New York State and County Data 10, 17 (2009) [hereinafter 
2007 N.Y. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC-02-A-23, 2002 Census of Agriculture: Min-
nesota State and County Data 9, 16 (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Minn. Data]; U.S. Dep’t 
of Agric., AC-02-A-27, 2002 Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State and County 
Data 9, 16 (2004) [hereinafter 2002 Neb. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC-02-A-32, 2002 
Census of Agriculture: New York State and County Data 9, 16 (2004) [hereinafter 
2002 N.Y. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC97-A-23, 1997 Census of Agriculture: Min-
nesota State and County Data 12, 20 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Minn. Data]; U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., AC97-A-27, 1997 Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State and Coun-
ty Data 12, 20 (1999) [hereinafter 1997 Neb. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC97-A-32, 
1997 Census of Agriculture: New York State and County Data 12, 20 (1999) [here-
inafter 1997 N.Y. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC92-A-23, 1992 Census of Agriculture: 
Minnesota State and County Data 10, 18 (1994) [hereinafter 1992 Minn. Data]; U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric., AC92-A-27, 1992 Census of Agriculture: Nebraska State and Coun-
ty Data 10, 18 (1994) [hereinafter 1992 Neb. Data]; U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC92-A-32, 
1992 Census of Agriculture: New York State and County Data 10, 18 (1994) [here-
inafter 1992 N.Y. Data]. Between 1997 and 2002, the Department of Agriculture slightly 
changed the labeling for farming data by economic size. In 1997, the Department of Agri-
culture gave a statistic for the “market value of agricultural products sold and direct sales.” 
See 1997 Minn. Data, supra, at 12. In 2002, the corresponding statistical section was named 
“market value of agricultural products sold.” See 2002 Minn. Data, supra, at 9. In the in-
troduction section of the report, the Department of Agriculture explains that it changed 
some of its data to make reporting easier for respondents and provide more detailed in-
formation to readers. See 2002 Minn. Data, supra, at x. It appears that there is no differ-
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small farms has increased, while the number of medium-sized farms has 
decreased.17 Similarly, the number of farms with very high and low 
gross sales has increased in all three states, while the number of farms 
with moderate gross sales has decreased.18 Thus, despite their different 
approaches, all three states have experienced similar changes in farm-
ing demographics.19 
 Part I of this Note provides an overview of the design, function, and 
criticisms of right-to-farm-statutes. Part II discusses the specific statutes 
and cases that govern agricultural preservation in New York, Nebraska, 
and Minnesota. Part III offers a visual and numeric comparison of de-
mographic shifts in the three states between 1987 and 2007. Finally, Part 
IV analyzes these trends and suggests that legislatures should pass stat-
utes that bolster medium-sized farms, rather than punishing large or 
corporate farms. It further argues that legislatures should delegate au-
thority to agricultural advisory councils to favor the farming practices of 
small farms. 
I. Design, Uses, and Limitations of Right-to-Farm Statutes 
A. Development and Use of Right-to-Farm Statutes 
 Most states passed right-to-farm statutes in the late 1970s and early 
1980s in response to population shifts in the American countryside af-
ter World War II.20 During this period, people moved out of cities and 
into suburban and exurban areas.21 The growing suburbs caused de-
velopers to convert about 3 million acres of farm land for residential 
purposes each year.22 Through right-to-farm statutes, states sought to 
                                                                                                                      
ence between the statistics in each case, despite the labeling change. Compare id. at 9, with 
1997 Minn. Data, supra, at 12. 
17 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2002 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 9; 2002 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 9; 2002 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 9; 1997 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 
12; 1997 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 12; 1997 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 12; 1992 Minn. 
Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra 
note 16, at 10. 
18 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
19 Compare 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17, and 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, 
at 17, and 2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17, with Minn. 1992 Data, supra note 16, at 18, 
and 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 18, and 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
20 Hand, supra note 1, at 290; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1696. 
21 Hand, supra note 1, at 290. 
22 Id. at 289. 
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slow the rate of land conversion by protecting farmers from nuisance 
and zoning laws.23 They reasoned that nuisance suits and zoning laws 
could make farming unprofitable.24 Early writings on right-to-farm stat-
utes questioned their constitutional soundness but were hesitantly op-
timistic that such statutes could preserve farmland.25 
                                                                                                                     
 Right-to-farm statutes typically protect farmers in two ways: (1) by 
offering protection from nuisance suits, and (2) by limiting the author-
ity of local governments to pass laws that inhibit farming.26 Typically, 
nuisance protection varies from state to state.27 Some states protect 
farmers if their nuisance-causing activities have priority in time—the 
“coming to the nuisance” affirmative defense.28 Other states, such as 
Minnesota, disqualify potential nuisance claims by imposing a rather 
brief statute of limitations.29 These states, however, generally allow nui-
sance claims arising from the farmer’s negligence.30 Bans on nuisance 
claims provide the first line of protection to farmers.31 They are often 
more effective in the early stages of land conversion projects because of 
the time it takes for new suburbs to develop sufficient political clout to 
alter zoning regulations.32 
 Restrictions on unfavorable zoning laws are the second form of 
protection offered by right-to-farm statutes.33 Some states restrict mu-
nicipalities from passing laws that limit farm use.34 For example, a town 
in New York could not pass zoning laws that would limit a farmer’s abil-
ity to construct mobile homes for migrant workers.35 Conversely, a state 
may encourage agricultural zoning to preserve farms.36 Agricultural 
zoning offers the added advantage of separating land by use.37 Some 
scholars fear that differences in cultural expectations concerning land 
 
23 See Centner, supra note 2, at 88; Hand, supra note 1, at 295. 
24 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1697, 1704 n.66. 
25 See Hand, supra note 1, at 332, 347, 349–50. 
26 See Centner, supra note 2, at 88; Hand, supra note 1, at 295. 
27 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1695. 
28 See Hamilton, supra note 7, at 106; Hand, supra note 1, at 306–07. 
29 See Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2010); Kuhl v. Halquist, No. A05-2097, 2006 Minn. App. 
Unpub. LEXIS 1123, at *15–17 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2006). 
30 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1707. 
31 See id. at 1697. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 1703. 
34 Id. at 1705; see also N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 305-a (McKinney 2011) (forbidding 
municipalities from “unreasonably restrict[ing] . . . farm operations”). 
35 Town of Lysander v. Hafner, 759 N.E.2d 356, 359 (N.Y. 2001). 
36 See, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 304–305 (discussing the use of tax incentives in 
agricultural zoning). 
37 See id. 
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use cause many of the conflicts between established farming communi-
ties and new suburban residents.38 Separating land by use can minimize 
cultural conflicts between farmers and new residents before either par-
ty experiences harm.39 
 Some states also use other techniques to encourage agricultural 
preservation.40 Agricultural preservation statutes include not only right-
to-farm laws but also tax incentives, development rights purchasing pro-
grams, and other laws designed primarily to protect farmland as open 
space.41 To illustrate, both Massachusetts and New York purchase con-
servation easements that restrict future development of land.42 States 
may also reduce assessments on farm land to decrease property taxes.43 
Tax breaks and purchasing programs, like right-to-farm statutes, attempt 
to preserve farmland and thus are closely linked to right-to-farm stat-
utes.44 Nevertheless, this Note focuses on different applications of right-
to-farm statutes. 
B. The Limitations and Controversies of Right-to-Farm Statutes 
 Despite right-to-farm statutes’ purpose of protecting traditional 
economies, cultural values, open spaces, and the environment, many 
scholars criticize their design and implementation.45 Scholars are con-
cerned that right-to-farm laws create loopholes for agribusiness to skirt 
environmental laws.46 For example, scholars worry that right-to-farm 
laws allow CAFOs, especially hog farms, to avoid the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) and dump excess phosphorus into local rivers.47 In response to 
claims of CWA violations, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
                                                                                                                      
38 See, e.g., Dowell, supra note 8, at 127–28. 
39 See id. 
40 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1695. 
41 Id.; cf. Sheronick, supra note 3 (describing methods of agricultural preservation). 
42 Sean F. Nolon & Cozata Solloway, Comment, Preserving Our Heritage: Tools to Cultivate 
Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 Pace L. Rev. 591, 600, 605–06 (1997); Farmland 
Protection Program, N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts., http://www.agriculture.ny.gov/ 
(search for “Farmland Protection Program” then follow “New York State Department of 
Agriculture and Markets” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
43 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 305 (McKinney 2011); Reinert, supra note 6, at 1695. 
44 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300 (noting that the overall purpose of its agricul-
tural preservation statues applies to both right-to-farm statutes and development rights 
purchasing programs); see Reinert, supra note 6, at 1695. 
45 See, e.g., Centner, supra note 2, at 141–42; Joshua M. Duke & Scott A. Malcom, Legal 
Risk in Agriculture: Right-to-Farm Laws and Institutional Change, 75 Agric. Sys. 295, 296–97 
(2003); Alan J. Knauf, The Southview Farm Case: A Giant Step to End Special Treatment for Agri-
culture Under Environmental Laws, 5 Albany L. Envtl. Outlook 2, 2–3 (2000). 
46 See Centner, supra note 2, at 92; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1736. 
47 See Centner, supra note 2, at 92. 
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moved to include these farms as point sources within the statute.48 In 
so doing, the EPA subjected CAFOs to stricter limits on effluent dis-
charge.49 Some believe that despite EPA’s efforts, CWA violations per-
sist because right-to-farm statutes allow, and even promote, CAFOs that 
cause significant land deterioration and environmental damage.50 One 
commentator argues that right-to-farm statutes offer insufficient pro-
tection from nuisance suits, particularly for small farms, and therefore 
should be strengthened.51 The fear that environmental damage out-
weighs the societal benefits of right-to-farm statutes remains a powerful 
criticism.52 
 Beyond their potential environmental costs, right-to-farm statutes 
may also be ineffective.53 Starting in the early 1980s, scholars began to 
investigate the power of right-to-farm laws and whether they would re-
duce conflicts over land use.54 By the 1990s some scholars, noting that 
the development of right-to-farm statutes appeared ineffective and in-
equitable, questioned why states did not create a comprehensive sys-
tem.55 Protecting farmers from nuisance suits might encourage them to 
act inefficiently, thereby creating problems for the community.56 Such 
inefficiencies appear because of right-to-farm statutes’ lack of clarity 
which, if remedied by more explicit regulations, could promote bar-
gaining between farmers and residents.57 
                                                                                                                      
48 See id. Point sources are defined in the CWA as “any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(14) (2006). 
49 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (defining the requirements for regulation of point sources 
in the CWA); see also Terrence J. Centner, Challenging NPDES Permits Granted Without Public 
Participation, 38 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 1, 5 (2010) (discussing how the EPA changed the 
regulations of CAFOs in the CWA as a result of public participation). 
50 Centner, supra note 2, at 92; see Hamilton, supra note 7, at 109–10; Knauf, supra note 
45, at 8. 
51 See Dowell, supra note 8, at 152–53.. 
52 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1717–18, 1722. 
53 See Duke & Malcom, supra note 45, at 302; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1724. 
54 See Mark B. Lapping et al., Right-to-Farm Laws: Do They Resolve Land Use Conflicts? 38 J. 
Soil & Water Conservation, 465, 467 (1983) (indicating that right-to-farm laws are often 
worded too vaguely, but at least attempt to solve conflicts regarding land uses); Reinert, 
supra note 6, at 1728. 
55 See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 7, at 118. 
56 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1728. 
57 See id. at 1720; see also Tory H. Lewis, Note, Managing Manure: Using Good Neighbor 
Agreements to Regulate Pollution from Agricultural Production, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1555, 1584 
(2008) (describing “Good Neighbor Agreements” as a solution to farming nuisances). 
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 To the extent that right-to-farm statutes are effective, scholars 
question whom they benefit.58 The traditional concern is that right-to-
farm statutes give too much assistance to large commercial farms with-
out reciprocal benefits to the environment.59 The agricultural commu-
nity has shown mixed interest in environmental preservation.60 If both 
farmers and their neighbors use their land in socially and economically 
beneficial ways, one might question why legislatures should favor farm-
ers.61 In turn, one could propose a Coasean solution—which empha-
sizes market efficiency in the law—of encouraging farmers and resi-
dents to sign contracts where farmers agree to basic environmental 
protection standards in exchange for more protections from litiga-
tion.62 The value of right-to-farm statutes remains an open question, 
but state legislatures continue to promote them as a matter of policy.63 
 Additionally, both the Farm Bill and hobby farms influence the 
development and use of agricultural land.64 The Farm Bill is a compre-
hensive set of laws designed to provide food security, promote farming, 
and develop ethanol production.65 However, one scholar notes that the 
Farm Bill has caused massive industrialization of American agricul-
ture.66 On a smaller scale, hobby farms—farms that are run for their 
owner’s enjoyment rather than as a source of income—raise some envi-
ronmental concerns.67 Specifically, hobby farms sometimes represent a 
                                                                                                                      
58 See Centner, supra note 2, at 141–42; Hand, supra note 1, at 347; Peter J. Wall, Land 
Use and Agricultural Exceptionalism, 16 San Joaquin Agric. L. Rev. 219, 236–27 (2006–07); 
see also R. Lisle Baker, My Tree Versus Your Solar Collector or Your Well Versus My Septic System?—
Exploring Responses to Beneficial but Conflicting Neighboring Uses of Land, 37 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. 
Rev. 1, 8 (2010) (discussing right-to-farm statutes in the context of reciprocal harms). 
59 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1715, 1722. 
60 See Patricia E. Salkin & Brenda Stadel, Agricultural Land Preservation, in Zoning and 
Land Use Controls § 56.01 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2011), available at LexisNexis 
ZLANDU. 
61 See Baker, supra note 58, at 8; Wall, supra note 58, at 236–37. 
62 See Lewis, supra note 57, at 1570, 1584; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1734–35. 
63 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1738. 
64 See Eubanks, supra note 1, at 214–15, 225; Jess M. Krannich, A Modern Disaster: Agri-
cultural Land, Urban Growth, and the Need for a Federally Organized Comprehensive Land Use 
Planning Model, 16 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 57, 83–84 (2006); Jesse J. Richardson, Down-
zoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 59, 65–66 (2003). 
65 See Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–246, 122 Stat. 1651 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 15, 16, 21, 25, 26, 40, and 42 U.S.C.); Neil 
D. Hamilton, Feeding the World’s Future: Agrarian Justice and the Rule of Law, 13 Drake J. Ag-
ric. L. 545, 556–57 (2008). See generally, Eubanks, supra note 1 (providing a history of the 
Farm Bill). 
66 See Eubanks, supra note 1, at 251–52. 
67 See Krannich, supra note 64, at 83–84; Richardson, supra note 64, at 65–66. 
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step toward developing farmland for residential purposes.68 Thus, 
farmers are pressured to either become larger and more industrialized 
or sell their land for division.69 
 Much of the ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of right-to-farm 
statutes results from confusion about whom they are designed to as-
sist.70 State legislatures often preface their right-to-farm statutes with a 
vague statement of intent.71 In these cases, it is unclear whether the 
legislature was most interested in protecting a rural farming culture, 
the environment, or the viability of an agricultural economy.72 More-
over, statutes designed to protect small farms may be more useful to 
large farms because the scale of nuisances often increases with farm 
size.73 Much of the language of right-to-farm statutes, however, is more 
related to the cultural and environmental benefits associated with small 
farms than the economic influences of agribusinesses.74 
                                                                                                                     
II. Statutes, Cases, and History of Agricultural Preservation 
Laws by State 
 States employ a variety of tactics to preserve agriculture.75 New 
York, Nebraska, and Minnesota use three different techniques to assist 
farms while also trying to limit the influence of agribusinesses.76 These 
methods are only a sample of available strategies.77 Their statutory lan-
guage, which ranges from broad statements about the historical impor-
 
68 See Krannich, supra note 64, at 83–84. 
69 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1699; see Eubanks, supra note 1, at 251–52; Richardson, su-
pra note 64, at 65–66. 
70 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 108 (stating that right-to-farm statutes are too broadly ap-
plicable). 
71 Reinert, supra note 6; see, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300 (McKinney 2011) 
(stating that the purpose of New York agricultural preservation is “to conserve, protect and 
encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural land for production of 
food and other agricultural products”). 
72 Reinert, supra note 6, at 1718–19; see, e.g., N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300. 
73 Hamilton, supra note 7, at 112. 
74 See Centner, supra note 2, at 141. Scholars refer to farms of less than 1000 acres, with 
gross sales of less than $250,000, as small family farms. Chester, supra note 8, at 80; Reinert, 
supra note 6, at 1698. While the per capita sales of small farms do not match those of large 
farms and CAFOs, they fit more neatly within traditional conceptions of preservation. 
Centner, supra note 2, at 141–42; see Salkin, supra note 60, § 56.01. 
75 Centner, supra note 2, at 147; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1695. 
76 Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2010); N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. 
Law § 300 (McKinney 2011). 
77 See Centner, supra note 2, at 147 (listing the right-to-farm statutes of all fifty states). 
Some consider North Carolina to have the model right-to-farm statute. Lapping et al., 
supra note 54, at 465; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1707. 
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tance of agriculture, to a ban on corporate farming, to limits on nui-
sance protections for concentrated animal feeding operations (CA-
FOs), provides solid grounds for a comparative analysis.78 
A. New York: A Standard Right-to-Farm Statute with an  
Agricultural Advisory Council 
 New York’s agricultural preservation statute offers a basic set of 
protections similar to many states.79 The statute begins with a statement 
of purpose.80 The purpose statement indicates that New York’s lands 
are in jeopardy, and therefore all efforts should be made to “protect 
and encourage the development and improvement of its agricultural 
land for production of food” and “protect agricultural lands as valued 
natural and ecological resources.”81 Farming land is also valuable as an 
economic resource, as it accounts for billions of dollars in New York’s 
economy.82 
 The statute offers both nuisance and zoning protections to farm-
ers, declaring that “an agricultural practice shall not constitute a private 
nuisance,”83 and “local governments . . . shall not unreasonably restrict 
or regulate farm operations.”84 The statute allows for an exception to 
this protection when the local government can show that the “public 
health or safety is threatened” by the agricultural practice.85 
 New York’s nuisance protection for farmers has an interesting twist 
because the statute requires the State Advisory Council on Agriculture 
(Council) to determine whether an activity is a “sound agricultural prac-
tice” before farmers receive protection.86 The Governor of New York 
appoints members of local farming communities to the Council, which 
advises the State Department of Agriculture on all farming and agricul-
tural preservation issues.87 Many states require that farmers follow some 
                                                                                                                      
78 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 561.19; N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 
§ 300. 
79 See Centner, supra note 2, at 113. 
80 N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300. 
81 Id. 
82 Nolon & Solloway, supra note 42, at 592. 
83 N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 308. 
84 Id. § 305-a. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. §§ 308, 309; Centner, supra note 2, at 113. 
87 N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 309; Advisory Council on Agriculture, N.Y. State Dep’t of 
Agric. & Mkts., http://www.agmkt.state.ny.us/AP/agservices/advisory.html (search for 
“Advisory Council on Agriculture” then follow “New York State Department of Agriculture 
and Markets” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). 
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baseline of accepted practices, but New York’s statute attempts to define 
how such practices will be evaluated.88 The Council’s authority, espe-
cially when considered in light of the statute’s purpose statement, allows 
for selective protection of farming practices that are most beneficial to 
the economy, culture, and environment.89 Thus, the Council could fa-
vor the practices of small farms instead of agribusiness and CAFOs.90 
 Case law precedent concerning New York’s right-to-farm statute 
instructs New York courts to uphold protections for farmers in the ab-
sence of compelling evidence to do otherwise.91 For example, in Town 
of Lysander v. Hafner, the court evaluated whether a town could pass 
zoning ordinances that limited a farmer’s ability to construct mobile 
homes for housing migratory workers.92 The court interpreted the 
meaning of “farm operations” broadly to include residential buildings 
and held that the town did not present sufficient evidence to show a 
risk to public safety–-the requirement for an exception to New York’s 
right-to-farm law.93 
 Additionally, case law precedent reinforces the Council’s determi-
nations concerning agricultural practices.94 For example, a court up-
held the Council’s determination that storage of pig manure in a large 
concrete container is a sound agricultural practice.95 The court also 
decided that the Council has the authority to determine practices for 
pesticide use.96 Although these rulings reinforce the authority of the 
Council to protect farmers, they do not embody the environmental 
protections envisioned in the purpose statement of New York’s agricul-
tural preservation statutes.97 New York’s laws thus offer an interesting 
point of comparison because of their effectiveness in preserving agri-
culture and promoting family farms.98 
                                                                                                                      
88 N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 308; see Dowell, supra note 8, at 133–35. 
89 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 308; Dowell, supra note 8, at 134–35. 
90 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 308; Dowell, supra note 8, at 135. 
91 See Town of Lysander v. Hafner, 759 N.E.2d 356, 359 (N.Y. 2001); Village of Lacona 
v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Agric. & Mkts., 858 N.Y.S.2d 833, 835 (App. Div. 2008); Pure Air & 
Water, Inc. v. Davidsen, 668 N.Y.S.2d 248, 250–51(App. Div. 1998). 
92 759 N.E.2d at 359. 
93 Id. 
94 Pure Air & Water, 669 N.Y.S.2d at 250–51. 
95 Lacona, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 835–36. 
96 Id. at 835. 
97 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law §§ 300, 305-a, 308, 309 (McKinney 2011); Lysander, 759 
N.E.2d at 358–59; Lacona, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 835–36; Pure Air & Water, 668 N.Y.S.2d at 250–51. 
98 See N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law § 300. 
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B. Nebraska: Nuisance Protection and a Constitutional Ban on  
Corporate Farming 
 Nebraska’s laws combined a standard nuisance protection clause 
and a constitutional amendment that restricted the ability of out-of-
state corporations to operate farms in the state.99 The Nebraska legisla-
ture, in passing the Constitutional amendment, addressed concerns 
about the influences of agribusinesses and provided additional protec-
tion to family farms because only they offered sufficient cultural and 
environmental benefits.100 The combination of nuisance protection 
and limitations on corporate farming between 1982 and 2006 distin-
guish Nebraska’s agricultural preservation laws from those of many 
other states.101 
1. The Structure and Limitations of Nebraska’s Right-to-Farm Statute 
 Nebraska’s right-to-farm statute provides a basic set of nuisance 
protections for both animal and crop farms.102 The statute provides 
that “[a] farm . . . shall not be found to be a public or private nui-
sance,” as long as the farming activity is a preexisting use.103 Another 
section of the statute defines “farm” as “any tract of land over ten acres 
in area used for or devoted to the commercial production of farm 
products.”104 The statute thus excludes very small farms from the nui-
sance shield.105 The legislature makes no further distinction between 
types of farms in the basic right-to-farm statute.106 The statute’s “com-
ing to the nuisance” defense, however, requires the farming practices to 
predate the plaintiff’s enjoyment of the land.107 Nebraska also allows 
                                                                                                                      
99 Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403 (2010). The amendment 
was later struck down in 2006. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1271 (8th Cir. 2006). 
100 See Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate-Farming Measures in a Post-Jones World, 14 Drake J. 
Agric. L. 97, 120–21 (2009); Chester, supra note 8, at 82. 
101 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403; Jones, 470 F.3d at 1271; 
Schutz, supra note 100, at 106. Twelve other states have some form of corporate farming 
restriction. Schutz, supra note 100, at 106. 
102 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-4402 to -4403; see Reinert, supra note 6, at 1707 (describing the 
North Carolina right-to-farm law as a model statute, and detailing its nuisance protec-
tions). 
103 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403. 
104 Id. § 2-4402. The statute also offers similar protections to “public grain warehouse[s].” 
See id. § 2-4403. 
105 Id. § 2-4402. 
106 Id. § 2-4403. 
107 Id. 
2012] Right-to-Farm Laws and Demographic Shifts 111 
the use of zoning to protect farms, but that scheme is not part of the 
right-to-farm statute.108 
 The Nebraska Supreme Court interprets the right-to-farm statute 
narrowly, thereby offering farmers protection only when their opera-
tions fit within the text of the statute.109 Most recently, the court held 
that the statute does not apply retroactively.110 In earlier cases, the court 
was not sympathetic to CAFOs for hogs, finding that construction of hog 
confinement areas did not protect the farmers because they changed 
their use of their land and thus could not avail themselves of the “com-
ing to the nuisance” defense.111 These cases show that the court did not 
strike down nuisance protections for CAFOs because the farms should 
not have been protected within the plain meaning of the statute.112 
2. A Constitutional Amendment Banning Corporate Farming 
 An amendment to Nebraska’s Constitution changed the back-
ground of agricultural preservation by prohibiting out-of-state corpo-
rate farming.113 While in effect, article twelve, section eight provided 
that “[n]o corporation or syndicate shall acquire . . . any title to real 
estate used for farming or ranching in this state, or engage in farming 
or ranching.”114 Additionally, the amendment did not apply to “family 
farm[s]” where the “majority of the voting stock is held by members of 
a family . . . at least one of whom is a person residing on or actively en-
gaged in the day to day labor and management of the farm.”115 In this 
way, the people of Nebraska tried to affirmatively ban agribusinesses to 
preserve their culture and heritage.116 
 In Jones v. Gale, the Eighth Circuit held article twelve, section eight 
of the Nebraska Constitution invalid because it violated the dormant 
                                                                                                                      
108 See, e.g., id. § 23-114.03 (allowing counties to set restrictions on the use of agricul-
tural lands); id. § 81-2,147.12 (preempting local laws relating to the sale of seeds). 
109 Soukop v. ConAgra, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Neb. 2002); Flansburgh v. Coffey, 
370 N.W.2d 127, 129, 131 (Neb. 1985); Cline v. Franklin Pork, Inc., 361 N.W.2d 566, 572 
(Neb. 1985). 
110 Soukop, 653 N.W.2d at 658 (holding that the 1998 addition of grain operators in the 
definition of farm did not extend retroactive protections for grain operators). 
111 See Flansburgh, 370 N.W.2d at 129, 131; Cline, 361 N.W.2d at 569, 572. 
112 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403; Flansburgh, 370 N.W.2d at 129, 131; Cline, 361 N.W.2d 
at 569, 572. 
113 Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); see Chester, supra note 8, at 82, 84; Schutz, supra 
note 100, at 106–07. 
114 Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982). 
115 Id. 
116 See id.; Schutz, supra note 100, at 101–02. 
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commerce clause.117 The dormant commerce clause provides that, be-
cause Congress has the affirmative power to regulate commerce, states 
may not act to limit interstate commerce.118 The court specifically at-
tacked the exception that allowed corporate farming for family farms 
that were managed by Nebraska residents.119 The statute violated the 
dormant commerce clause because it discriminated against out-of-state 
businesses.120 Because only part of the statute violated the dormant 
commerce clause, it may still be permissible for a state to ban corporate 
farming all together.121 Nevertheless, Nebraska case law required the 
Eighth Circuit to hold the entire statute unconstitutional instead of 
simply severing the offending provision.122 
 When one considers the amendment along with the right-to-farm 
statute, Nebraska had a developed a distinct strategy for agricultural 
preservation.123 
C. Minnesota: Limits on Nuisance Protection for CAFOs and a Ban on 
Corporate Farming 
 The Minnesota agricultural preservation statutes both provide 
small farms with nuisance protection and ban corporate farming.124 
The state’s right-to-farm statute operates like those of New York and 
Nebraska.125 The statute provides that a farm “is not and shall not be-
come a private or public nuisance after two years from its established 
date of operation.”126 It also contains a few standard limitations—the 
farm must be in an “agriculturally zoned area,” the farmer must follow 
“generally accepted agricultural practices,” and the farmer cannot op-
erate equipment negligently.127 The statute defines farm as “a facility 
and its appurtenances for the production of crops, livestock, poultry, 
dairy products or poultry products, but not a facility primarily engaged 
                                                                                                                      
117 470 F.3d 1261, 1271 (8th Cir. 2006). 
118 See id. at 1267. 
119 Id. at 1264, 1267. 
120 Id. at 1269. 
121 Id. at 1271. 
122 Id. 
123 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-4402, -4403 (2010). 
124 Minn. Stat. §§ 500.24, 561.19 (2010); see Schutz, supra note 100, at 132–33; Ches-
ter, supra note 8, at 81–82. 
125 See Minn. Stat. § 561.19; Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403; N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 
§§ 305-a, 308 (McKinney 2011). 
126 Minn. Stat. § 561.19. 
127 Id. 
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in processing agricultural products.”128 Interestingly, the statute does 
not apply to farms that can hold more than 1000 hogs or 2500 cattle.129 
Although Minnesota’s right-to-farm statute provides standard protec-
tions for farmers, the legislature must have been concerned about large 
CAFOs abusing environmental protection laws.130 
 Minnesota has another statute that bans certain types of corporate 
farming.131 In the statute’s purpose statement, “the family farm” is de-
scribed as “the most socially desirable mode of agricultural production” 
and essential to “the stability and well-being of rural society in Minne-
sota and the nuclear family.”132 The statute goes on to list certain ex-
ceptions to the ban, mostly related to family corporations.133 The ex-
ceptions have some of the residency requirements seen in the Nebraska 
constitution but are more complex.134 Consequently, the reasoning in 
Jones v. Gale probably does not undermine Minnesota’s ban on corpo-
rate farming.135 
 Similar to Nebraska, the Minnesota courts interpret these statutes 
according to their plain meaning.136 Farmers may be liable for nui-
sances, even when using generally accepted agricultural equipment.137 
Plaintiffs must show that the farmer used that equipment negligently.138 
For example, a dairy farm that used a clay manure storage area could 
commit a nuisance from the odor of that manure if the farmers did not 
properly construct the storage basin.139 
                                                                                                                      
128 Id. The statute uses “agricultural operation” instead of farm. Id. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. 
131 Id. § 500.24. 
132 Minn. Stat. § 500.24. 
133 Id. 
134 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 500.24. 
135 See Minn. Stat. § 500.24; Jones, 470 F.3d at 1271; see also infra notes 159–232 and ac-
companying text (analyzing the statues in context). 
136 See, e.g., Lilyerd v. Carlson, 499 N.W.2d 803, 811 (Minn. 1993); Kuhl v. Halquist Farms, 
Inc., No. A05–2097, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1123, at *15–*17 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 
3, 2006); Wendinger v. Frost Farms, Inc., 662 N.W.2d 546, 551, 554–55 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2003). 
137 Kuhl, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1123, at *15; Wendinger, 662 N.W.2d at 554–
55. 
138 Kuhl, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1123, at *15–17; Wendinger, 662 N.W.2d at 
554–55. 
139 See Kuhl, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1123, at *2, *16–17. 
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III. Empirical Data on Demographic Changes in Farming by 
State, Farm Size, and Gross Sales 
A. An Overview of Methods and Considerations 
 The U.S. Department of Agriculture keeps detailed records of 
changes in farming output and demographics, measured every five 
years.140 The Department of Agirculture and the Census Bureau have 
collected data on agricultural demographics since 1840.141 For the pur-
poses of this Note, data from 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 will be 
analyzed.142 Demographic changes are important because they may 
signify the increase of agribusinesses at the expense of more traditional 
agriculture.143 The current literature, published before some of the 
more recent agricultural censuses, offers only a brief analysis of demo-
graphic changes and does not attempt to link those changes with spe-
cific statutes.144 
 Although New York, Nebraska, and Minnesota have different agri-
cultural protection statutes, they all exhibit similar trends—large and 
small sized farms are increasing in number while medium size farms 
are decreasing in number.145 The following section highlights the data 
indicating these demographic shifts. 
 New York and Minnesota experienced the most similar changes in 
demographics.146 Nebraska’s numbers are somewhat deceptive, how-
ever, because the average farm is much larger in Nebraska than New 
York and Minnesota.147 In 2007, the average size of a farm was 953 acres 
                                                                                                                      
140 U.S. Dep’t of Agric., AC-07-A-51, 2007 Census of Agriculture (2009) [herein-
after 2007 Census]. 
141 Id. 
142 See id.; see also Historical Census Publications, Dep’t of Agric., http://www.agcensus. 
usda.gov/Publications/Historical_Publications/index.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2012) (indi-
cating a gap of available data between 1950 and 1987). 
143 Chester, supra note 8, at 80; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1698. 
144 See generally Reinert, supra note 6 (analyzing the effects of right-to-farm statutes on 
family farms without a detailed analysis of demographic shifts). 
145 See 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 
2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2002 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 16; 2002 Neb. 
Data, supra note 16, at 16; 2002 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 16; 1997 Minn. Data, supra 
note 16, at 20; 1997 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 20; 1997 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 12, 
20; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 20; 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 20; 1992 N.Y. 
Data, supra note 16, at 20. 
146 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
147 2007 Census, supra note 140, at 348–50. 
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in Nebraska, 197 acres in New York, and 332 acres in Minnesota.148 At 
the same time, Nebraska had 36,352 farms, compared to 36,352 in New 
York and 80,992 farms in Minnesota.149 The states all experienced simi-
lar trends in demographic shifts in size despite different statutory ap-
proaches to agricultural preservation.150 
B. Demographic Changes in Number of Farms 
 New York, Nebraska, and Minnesota experienced similar shifts in 
the number of small, medium, and large farms between 1987 and 
2007.151 The number of small farms increased in New York and Minne-
sota by 28.6% and 39.8% respectively; the number of small farms in 
Nebraska decreased by 1.7%.152 The number of medium-sized farms 
decreased in all three states, by 25.8% in New York, by 26.7% in Minne-
sota, and by 36.2% in Nebraska.153 The number of large farms in-
creased in all three states—by 35.8% in New York, by 45.2% in Minne-
sota, and by 6.9% in Nebraska.154 
 The demographic shifts in gross sales in New York, Nebraska, and 
Minnesota mirror the shifts in average farm size.155 The number of 
farms with low gross sales increased in New York by 14.5% and in Min-
nesota by 54.9%.156 Conversely, the number of farms with low gross 
sales in Nebraska decreased by 2.1%.157 Farms with moderate gross 
                                                                                                                      
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 See 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 
2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. 
Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
151 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. The statistics provided in this 
section are summaries of data provided in the appendix. 
152 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
153 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
154 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
155 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 10; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10. 
156 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 
Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10. 
157 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10. 
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sales decreased in all three states—by 30.5% in New York, by 42.8% 
Minnesota, and by 48.1% in Nebraska.158 Differing from the data by 
size, the number of farms with high gross sales increased in all three 
states—by 107.9% in New York, by 266.4% in Minnesota, and by 
216.9% in Nebraska.159 
                                                                                                                     
IV. The Demographic Trends Indicate That the Statutes  
Are Ineffective and Could Be Improved by  
More Tailored Action 
 The Department of Agriculture’s data indicates that, despite having 
different strategies for protecting small and large farms, New York, Ne-
braska, and Minnesota have similar demographic trends in the number 
of farms by size and gross sales.160 The lack of a correlation between di-
vergent statutory language and statistical results suggests that these agri-
cultural preservation statutes are not effective.161 Macroeconomic fac-
tors, such as the Farm Bill, probably have a greater effect on the success 
of agricultural preservation.162 Nevertheless, right-to-farm statutes can 
still play a role in environmental preservation.163 States can solve many 
of the problems associated with right-to-farm statutes by permitting state 
agricultural boards to consider not only sound practices but also the 
type of farm.164 
A. Demographic Data Indicates That Right-to-Farm Statutes are Ineffective 
 The demographic trends discussed in Part III suggest that the dif-
ferences in statutory language have little influence on farming growth. 
Notably, small and large farms have increased in all three states, while 
 
158 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 10; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10. 
159 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 10; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 10; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 10. 
160 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
161 See Neb. Const. art. XII, § 8 (1982); Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2010); N.Y. Agric. & 
Mkts Law. § 300 (McKinney 2011); 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. 
Data, supra note 16; 2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, 
at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
162 See Centner, supra note 2, at 90. See generally Eubanks, supra note 1. 
163 See Reinert, supra note 6, at 1738 (suggesting how right-to-farm statutes could be 
amended to preserve the environment). 
164 See Centner, supra note 2, at 143; Reinert, supra note 6, at 1736. 
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the number of medium-sized farms has decreased.165 The cause of the-
se trends and the overall effectiveness of the statutes, however, cannot 
be determined from the Department of Agriculture’s data alone.166 
The data offers no baseline for comparison because all states have 
right-to-farm statutes and all states differ in the structure of their agri-
cultural economy.167 
 Surprisingly, the data does not coincide with the expectation that 
divergent strategies for farm preservation would produce different re-
sults. Nebraska and Minnesota have made strong attempts to limit cor-
porate farming but have only experienced comparable increases in the 
number of farms with high gross sales to New York.168 To the extent 
that the data differs from state to state, Nebraska’s data is the most dis-
tinctive.169 Yet Nebraska and Minnesota have the most similar statutes, 
suggesting that New York should have more distinctive results.170 
 Nebraska’s deviation can partially be explained by the structure of 
its right-to-farm statute. Nebraska refused to extend nuisance protec-
tions to farms with less than ten acres.171 Accordingly, the most dra-
matic drop in the number of small farms occurred in farms with less 
than ten acres.172 The absence of this protection and the correspond-
ing drop in the number of small farms indicates the importance of nui-
sance shields in maintaining farms.173 Thus, although analysis of the 
demographic trends as a whole downplays the significance of right-to-
farm statutes, their presence is somewhat important. Other data does 
not show what occurs with the complete removal of nuisance protec-
tions.174 Neither Minnesota’s removal of nuisance protection for CA-
                                                                                                                      
 
165 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. Data, 
supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
166 See Centner, supra note 2, at 90 (suggesting economic factors influence farming 
population shifts). 
167 See id. at 87, 88. 
168 See 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 
2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 Neb. 
Data, supra note 16, at 18; 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
169 Compare 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17, and 2007 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, 
at 17, and 1992 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 18, and 1992 N.Y. Data, supra note 16, at 18, 
with 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 17, and 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 18. 
170 See supra notes 75–139 and accompanying text. 
171 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403 (2010). 
172 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10, 17; 1992 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10, 18. 
173 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-4403; 2007 Neb. Data, supra note 16, at 10, 17; 1992 Neb. 
Data, supra note 16, at 10, 18. 
174 See Minn. Stat. § 561.19 (2010); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 2-4402 to -4403; N.Y. Agric. & 
Mkts. Law §§ 300, 308 (McKinney. 2011); 2007 Minn. Data, supra note 16, at 17; 2007 
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FOs nor Nebraska and Minnesota’s general limitations on corporate 
farming correspond with shifts in farm’s land area or gross sales.175 The 
other small differences in Nebraska’s data trends are best explained by 
the differences in average farm size between Nebraska and the other 
two states.176 
                                                                                                                     
 While previous scholarship has focused on the distinction between 
small and large farms, the data indicates that distinguishing among 
three size groups reveals meaningfully different trends.177 Scholars tra-
ditionally separate farms into two categories—farms with less than both 
1000 acres and $250,000 in gross sales, and larger farms.178 It makes 
sense, however, to break farms into three categories—farms that do not 
produce enough revenue to support their owners (hobby farms), family 
farms, and agribusinesses.179 For the purpose of this Note, hobby farms 
are those with less than both $10,000 in gross sales and 100 acres.180 
 The drastic increases in the number of large farms and hobby 
farms, and corresponding decreases in medium-sized farms, indicate 
that economic pressures overwhelm the statutes’ strategies.181 Though 
right-to-farm statutes may be important for the protection of farms gen-
erally, attempts to limit corporate farming appear to be ineffective.182 
Despite having an outright ban on corporate farming, Nebraska and 
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Minnesota experienced drastic increases in the number of farms with 
more than $250,000 in gross sales (217% and 266%, respectively).183 
New York, which does not have such a ban, experienced a 108% in-
crease.184 Conversely, all three states saw a decrease in the number of 
moderate income farms.185 The decreases by gross sales ranged from 
30% to 48%.186 When grouped by size, the decreases ranged from 25% 
to 38%.187 
 Demographic shifts away from medium-sized farms threaten many 
of the cultural and economic benefits that agricultural preservation 
statutes seek to protect.188 Both New York and Minnesota explicitly jus-
tify their agricultural preservation statutes on the importance of pro-
tecting cultural values, traditional economies, and the environment.189 
Additionally, scholars attribute environmental benefits to medium-sized 
farms.190 Thus, it appears that agribusinesses and hobby farms unjustly 
benefit from right-to-farm statutes.191 
B. A Potential Solution: Granting Agricultural Advisory Councils Discretion to 
Favor Both Environmentally Sound Practices and Medium-Sized Farms 
 The disconnect between the purpose underlying right-to-farm stat-
utes and changing demographics suggests the need to revise the laws.192 
Proposed solutions are difficult to verify because the variation between 
states’ statutes and economies makes clear comparison almost impossi-
ble.193 Additionally, macroeconomic issues appear to drive the shifts in 
farming demographics.194 Agricultural preservation statutes can only 
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insulate certain populations from those pressures.195 Potential solutions, 
such as creating more distinctions within the statutes, encouraging con-
tractual agreements, and strengthening right-to-farm statutes offer some 
promise.196 Legislatures should proceed carefully in implementing any 
changes to right-to-farm statutes to minimize economic disruption.197 
Using state agricultural boards to decide which farms and practices are 
most deserving of protection will promote locally appropriate changes 
consistent with the purpose statements of agricultural preservation stat-
utes.198 
 First, universally strengthening right-to-farm statutes will not re-
verse the demographic trends because of the economic pressures driv-
ing agricultural industrialization.199 Some commentators champion the 
enhancement of right-to-farm statues as a solution to the decreasing 
number of farms.200 The more extreme version of this argument con-
tends that population migration and lack of cultural understanding are 
the primary threats to the American family farm.201 The more moder-
ate approach articulates that agricultural interests need more protec-
tion because states have not integrated current right-to-farm statutes 
with broader economic policies.202 The moderate argument correctly 
characterizes many of the problems facing American agriculture as 
both economic and cultural.203 Economic changes, more than cultural 
intolerance, drive agricultural demographics.204 
 Other proposed changes to agricultural preservation, such as mod-
ifying the structure of farm subsidies or encouraging contract forma-
tion, provide a background when considering the alteration of right-to-
farm statutes.205 First, the Farm Bill gives rise to many of the economic 
influences that alter the effectiveness of right-to-farm statutes.206 Sec-
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ond, fixing inconsistencies within right-to-farm statutes would permit 
farmers and residents to bargain more efficiently.207 Nevertheless, legis-
latures should change how right-to-farm statutes function by altering 
the rights they give to farmers and residents.208 
 Legislatures could start by enacting statutes that allow courts to dif-
ferentiate between different types of plaintiffs and defendants.209 Offer-
ing nuisance protections only to smaller farms and allowing claims only 
from local residents would further the goals of agricultural preserva-
tion.210 The idea that residents should have some right to sue, especially 
if a farmer drastically changes the type of farming practiced, comports 
with notions of fairness.211 Further, distinguishing plaintiffs and defen-
dants could account for local economic or environmental factors be-
cause they can incorporate the nuances of local farming economies.212 
 Allowing courts to differentiate based on plaintiffs and defendants 
does not fully address the declining number of medium-sized farms.213 
The argument advocates distinguishing between businesses and family 
farms because businesses can view nuisance as an expense rather than a 
threat to their livelihood.214 While the argument’s reasoning may be 
accurate, it does not properly account for the growing number of small 
farms.215 The legislatures and courts should therefore attempt to favor 
medium-sized farms.216 They should establish laws that account for lo-
cal culture, climate, and individual circumstances.217 However, courts 
may lack the specialized expertise to determine the subjective cultural 
and environmental benefits to a given farm or farming practice.218 
 State agricultural boards, such as New York’s Agricultural Advisory 
Council (Council), are the proper authorities to decide what types of 
farming to encourage.219 Statutes that define strict acreage and gross 
income requirements for nuisance protection might not be able to ac-
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count for differences in climate and economic structure.220 The New 
York State legislature has already charged the Council with determin-
ing “sound agricultural practices.”221 The Council should have the ex-
pertise to determine not only what practices are generally sound but 
also which most benefit the local economy and environment.222 
Through the delegation of authority and discretion to their agricultural 
boards, states may gradually modify the application of their agricultural 
preservation laws.223 
 The proposal of greater reliance on agricultural boards shifts the 
responsibility from courts to these boards.224 Greater reliance on agri-
cultural boards does not necessarily give farmers more certainty as to 
how they should act.225 The real advantage of shifting more discretion 
to agricultural boards would not be the certainty offered to any indi-
vidual claimant.226 Rather, the advantage would be that the boards 
could substantively change which types of farms to protect to increase 
fairness and environmental preservation.227 
 Furthermore, although modifying statutes risks disrupting existing 
economies and does not undermine the economic forces driving farm-
ing demographic shifts, gradual change can improve the efficacy of 
right-to-farm statutes’ preservation of the environment.228 Different 
strategies aimed at directing the benefits of right-to-farm statutes have 
not been effective, and one should question why modifying statutes to 
promote medium-sized farms would be any different.229 The two dan-
gers contradict each other—one cannot fail by causing insufficient 
economic change and simultaneously cause too much economic 
change.230 Nevertheless, both dangers are real, and legislatures should 
proceed with caution.231 By granting specialized agricultural boards 
primary oversight of developing local programs, states should be able 
to work gradually but effectively.232 Moreover, states may draw on the 
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wisdom of their counties’ experiences with local agricultural preserva-
tion ordinances.233 
 Through gradual exploration, states may improve the allocation of 
farming resources to preserve their cultural heritage and natural envi-
ronment.234 Rigid limitations and bans on corporate farming have 
failed to realize the goals of cultural and environmental preserva-
tion.235 States will need to alter the language in their right-to-farm stat-
utes to create agricultural advisory boards when appropriate and em-
power those boards to consider the totality of a farm’s circumstances.236 
Hopefully, these changes will allow states to prioritize the most deserv-
ing farms without causing economic hardship.237 
                                                                                                                     
Conclusion 
 Changing agricultural demographics will continue despite the best 
efforts of right-to-farm statutes, but legislatures can improve right-to-
farm statutes by allowing agricultural councils to favor medium-sized 
farms.238 The economic efficiencies of mass production will continue to 
cause large farms to increase in number.239 Nevertheless, legislative at-
tempts to design statutes that protect medium-sized farms can be more 
effective.240 An increasing number of large farms offer economic bene-
fits and a reliable food supply.241 Legislatures should therefore not at-
tempt to ban corporate farming, but rather should provide nuisance 
protections to medium-sized farms.242 Agricultural preservation boards 
are currently empowered to make decisions only on agricultural prac-
tices.243 Legislatures should expand the powers of their agricultural 
preservation boards to consider the local circumstances and the needs 
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of the individual farmer.244 In this way, the economic, agricultural, and 
social role of small farms will be protected for generations to come—
thus fulfilling the motivations of agricultural preservation statutes. 
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Table 1a: New York Farms by Size 




1 to 9 Acres 2,517 2,129 2,226 2,959 2,914 15.8 
10 to 49 Acres 6,114 5,201 5,499 8,359 8,799 43.9 
50 to 69 Acres 2,603 2,187 2,402 3,102 3,230 24.1 
70 to 99 Acres 3,254 2,704 2,786 3,415 3,684 13.2 
100 to 139 Acres 4,008 3,482 3,482 4,109 4,158 3.7 
140 to 179 Acres 3,126 2,774 2,649 2,848 2,775 -11.2 
180 to 219 Acres 2,709 2,257 2,084 2,308 2,061 -23.9 
220 to 259 Acres 2,246 1,928 1,752 1,591 1,537 -31.6 
260 to 499 Acres 7,289 6,120 5,491 5,078 4,141 -43.2 
500 to 999 Acres 3,112 2,713 2,530 2,457 2,014 -35.3 
1,000 to 1,999 Acres 654 680 688 812 760 16.2 
2,000 to 4,999 Acres 106 125 154 194 243 129.2 
> 5,000 Acres  5 6 14 23 36 620.0 
1 to 99 Acres 14,488 12,221 12,913 17,835 18,627 28.6 
100 to 999 Acres 22,490 19,274 17,988 18,391 16,686 -25.8 
> 1000 Acres 765 811 856 1,029 1,039 35.8 
 
Table 1b: New York Farms by Economic Class 




< $1,000 5,051 4,056 4,071 9,130 8,884 75.9 
$1,000 to $2,500 4,117 3,268 3,636 4,802 3,622 -12.0 
$2,500 to $4,999 4,061 3,389 3,424 3,496 3,291 -19.0 
$5,000 to $9,999 3,892 3,536 3,484 3,283 3,809 -2.1 
$10,000 to $24,999 4,426 4,156 4,269 4,203 4,809 8.7 
$25,000 to $49,999 3,337 2,601 2,673 2,695 2,746 -17.7 
$50,000 to $99,999 5,560 3,973 3,335 3,017 2,292 -58.8 
$100,000 to $249,999 5,554 5,053 4,442 3,876 3,271 -41.1 
$250,000 to $499,999 1,262 1,535 1,441 1,616 1,836 45.5 
$500,000 to $999,999 333 518 639 646 970 191.3 
> $1,000,000 150 221 343 491 822 448.0 
$1 to $9,999 17,121 14,249 14,615 20,711 19,606 14.5 
$10,000 to $249,999 18,877 15,783 14,719 13,791 13,118 -30.5 
> $250,000 1,745 2,274 2,423 2,753 3,628 107.9 
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Table2a: Nebraska Farms by Size 




1 to 9 Acres 5,090 3,698 2,591 1,656 2,270 -55.4 
10 to 49 Acres 4,296 4,302 4,733 5,664 6,581 53.2 
50 to 69 Acres 1,101 1,074 1,174 1,483 1,456 32.2 
70 to 99 Acres 2,875 2,510 2,557 2,732 2,825 -1.7 
100 to 139 Acres 2,140 1,913 2,058 2,247 2,232 4.3 
140 to 179 Acres 5,050 3,911 3,975 3,718 3,591 -28.9 
180 to 219 Acres 1,987 1,659 1,678 1,647 1,507 -24.2 
220 to 259 Acres 2,706 2,148 2,038 1,742 1,576 -41.8 
260 to 499 Acres 12,627 10,196 8,932 7,921 6,755 -46.5 
500 to 999 Acres 12,153 10,966 10,338 9,049 7,717 -36.5 
1,000 to 1,999 Acres 6,494 6,283 6,717 6,632 5,965 -8.1 
2,000 to 4,999 Acres 2,906 3,091 3,439 3,497 3,735 28.5 
> 5,000 Acres  1,077 1,172 1,224 1,367 1,502 39.5 
1 to 99 Acres 13,362 11,584 11,055 11,535 13,132 -1.7 
100 to 999 Acres 36,663 30,793 29,019 26,324 23,378 -36.2 
> 1000 Acres 10,477 10,546 11,380 11,496 11,202 6.9 
 
Table 2b: Nebraska Farms by Economic Class 




< $1,000 2,099 1,979 3,577 3,559 3,964 88.9 
$1,000 to $2,500 2,595 1,987 2,081 2,793 2,936 13.1 
$2,500 to $4,999 3,405 2,664 2,394 3,050 2,911 -14.5 
$5,000 to $9,999 5,515 4,021 3,497 4,118 3,515 -36.3 
$10,000 to $24,999 10,923 8,445 6,733 6,489 4,882 -55.3 
$25,000 to $49,999 10,681 8,362 6,962 6,187 4,221 -60.5 
$50,000 to $99,999 11,305 9,274 8,005 6,601 5,292 -53.2 
$100,000 to $249,999 10,188 10,850 10,852 9,177 7,979 -21.7 
$250,000 to $499,999 2,512 3,573 4,851 4,374 5,828 132.0 
$500,000 to $999,999 779 1,109 1 636 1,938 3,531 353.3 
> $1,000,000 500 659 866 1,069 2,653 430.6 
$1 to $9,999 13,614 10,651 11,549 13,520 13,326 -2.1 
$10,000 to $249,999 43,097 36,931 32,552 28,454 22,374 -48.1 
> $250,000 3,791 5,341 5,717 7,381 12,012 216.9 
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Table 3a: Minnesota Farms by Size 




1 to 9 Acres 4,613 3,517 3,090 3,591 3,687 -20.1 
10 to 49 Acres 9,481 8,927 10,104 16,546 16,927 78.5 
50 to 69 Acres 2,808 2,595 2,987 4,089 4,570 62.7 
70 to 99 Acres 6,534 5,501 6,033 6,983 7,577 16.0 
100 to 139 Acres 6,272 5,385 5,523 5,999 6,556 4.5 
140 to 179 Acres 9,333 7,486 6,992 6,884 6,976 -25.3 
180 to 219 Acres 5,812 4,818 4,544 4,350 4,155 -28.5 
220 to 259 Acres 5,862 4,956 4,210 3,992 3,813 -35.0 
260 to 499 Acres 19,289 16,621 14,611 13,030 12,220 -36.6 
500 to 999 Acres 10,814 10,497 9,781 8,986 8,323 -23.0 
1,000 to 1,999 Acres 3,619 3,913 4,251 4,554 4,264 17.8 
2,000 to 4,999 Acres 611 806 1,165 1,715 1,767 189.2 
> 5,000 Acres  31 57 76 120 157 406.5 
1 to 99 Acres 23,436 20,540 22,214 31,209 32,761 39.8 
100 to 999 Acres 57,382 49,763 45,661 43,241 42,043 -26.7 
> 1000 Acres 4,261 4,776 5,492 6,389 6,188 45.2 
 
Table 3b: Minnesota Farms by Economic Class 




< $1,000 6,076 5,054 9,829 13,181 11,410 87.8 
$1,000 to $2,500 5,839 4,671 4,818 9,662 9,775 67.4 
$2,500 to $4,999 6,509 5,387 5,260 6,959 8,434 29.6 
$5,000 to $9,999 8,293 7,028 6,179 7,289 7,696 -7.2 
$10,000 to $24,999 13,588 11,187 9,207 9,130 8,261 -39.2 
$25,000 to $49,999 12,983 10,168 8,033 7,390 6,127 -52.8 
$50,000 to $99,999 15,385 12,482 9,402 8,126 6,648 -56.8 
$100,000 to $249,999 12,830 13,958 12,839 10,018 9,537 -25.7 
$250,000 to $499,999 2,716 3,816 5,046 5,289 6,412 136.1 
$500,000 to $999,999 625 974 1,933 2,611 3,901 524.2 
> $1,000,000 235 354 821 1,184 2,791 1,087.7 
$1 to $9,999 20,411 17,104 21,904 31,804 31,626 54.9 
$10,000 to $249,999 50,249 40,865 32,821 31,935 28,732 -42.8 
> $250,000 3,576 5,144 7,800 9,084 13,104 266.4 
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